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approach, is incorporated in a number of texts as the systematic
formal search for a counterexample as a system of formal rules.
As we would all expect, the difficulty of the search increases
when disjunctions of possible models are involved, and as I and
most logicians would expect, the difficulty also increases when
existential quantifiers are present. These particular sets of rules
were chosen as much for formal goals as for psychological ease,
so I am not arguing that they are exactly the right representation
of ordinary deductions, but I do believe that J-L & B have not
presented a conclusive case against formal rule systems
generally.
The second argument is the alleged suppressibility of modus
ponens. Given a premise "If she meets her friend, Mary will go
to the play" and "Mary meets her friend" the consequent will be
deduced by modus ponens by most deducers. However, J-L & B
have found that if they also present a second premise, "If Mary
has enough money, she will go to the play," that reasoners will
not draw the conclusion that Mary goes to the play given that she
meets her friend. The authors conclude that modus ponens has
been "suppressed" and thus is not a mental rule. Perhaps, given
the second premise, subjects mentally rewrite the first premise
as "If Mary meets her friend and she has enough money, she will
go to the play," in which case modus ponens is not suppressed
but is inapplicable.
The third argument is related to the issue concerning existen-
tial quantification. J-L & B's argument that existential quan-
tification is no harder than universal seems to have two bases -
one a conceptual analysis and the other an experimental one. On
page 136 they give an example of a derivation using universal
quantifiers, noting that a comparable problem with existentials
"differs only in that the existential quantifier, 'some', in the
second premise has to be existentially instantiated, and so the
quantifier restored at the end of the derivation is also existential.
There is no principled way in which the derivations for the two
sorts of problems can be made to differ in length."
There is no recognition that existential instantiation in many
systems requires a new subproof, and that in others it requires
flagging a variable or in other ways giving special status to the
formula in question. (In fact, in the universal derivation there is
no mention of the necessary restriction on universal generaliza-
tion.) This raises doubts in my mind whether J-L & B have a
sufficient grasp of what is involved in formal existential infer-
ences.
J-L & B's experimental evidence involves two pairs of sen-
tences. The first sentence of each is "None of the painters is
related to any of the musicians," while the second sentences are,
respectively:
Some of the musicians are related to all of the authors.
All of the musicians are related to some of the authors.
The authors report that subjects drew only 23% correct conclu-
sions from the second pair but 64% from the first pair. They
apparently conclude "Hence, there is no intrinsic difference in
difficulty between existential and universal quantifiers" (p. 142),
but I think that they mean to argue that the difference in
difficulty cannot be explained by a difference between universal
and existential quantifiers because each problem contains the
same number of each quantifier. This is true, but it overlooks the
fact that some proofs are much more difficult than others
because of the ways in which the quantifier rules interact. In
some cases the restrictions can prove a major obstacle to unso-
phisticated reasoners.
In any event, it is impossible to tell from their description
what is transpiring because we are not told in the case where
only 23% correct conclusions were reached whether the other
subjects mistakenly thought no inference could be drawn or if
they drew incorrect inferences. My own bet would be on the
latter, since most untrained subjects have no intuitive grasp of
the restrictions on quantificational inferences. Indeed, most
trained subjects lose their grasp fairly quickly if they do not
rehearse, and there have even been logic texts which got the
subtleties wrong!
Mental models: Rationality, representation
and process
D. W. Green
Department of Psychology, Centre for Cognitive Science, University
College London, London WC1E6BT, England
Electronic mail: d.w.green@ucl.ac.uk
It is a pleasure to read Johnson-Laird & Byrne's (J-L & B's)
Deduction. It marshals the arguments and evidence for a
mental-model theory of deduction with sustained clarity, force,
and wit.
Hybrid rationality? Like theories based on mental rules, the
theory of mental models proposes that there is a general compe-
tence to be explained. The arguments and experimental evi-
dence favour the mental-model account of this general compe-
tence over a rule-based one. But is model construction and
manipulation necessary for correct deductive performance? The
short answer is "no." Trivially, if the answer to a problem is
known, it can be retrieved. More pertinently, as J-L & B
acknowledge, some individuals, tutored in logic or argumenta-
tion, may use rules or "tricks " for certain tasks. Different forms
of reasoning may therefore coexist within the same individual.
In addition, individuals may find shortcuts to solve specific kinds
of problem. What was derived initially by envisaging a model
might, during the course of the experiment, result in proce-
dures which derive answers directly from the linguistic content.
Hence, there are a variety of circumstances where model
construction need not mediate rational response. If this conclu-
sion is granted, it points to the need to consider individual
patterns of performance.
Despite individual differences, I imagine that J-L & B would
wish to claim that human rationality is fundamentally based on a
unitary underlying competence and is not hybrid in the sense of
involving both general procedures (e.g., those proposed in the
theory of mental models) and domain-specific procedures, such
as pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak 1985) or the
cheater-detector algorithm in the social contract theory of Cos-
mides (1989; see also Gigerenzer & Hug 1992). Mental-model
theory is, of course, more general than any domain-specific
theory and is more parsimonious than any hybrid account; but
neither of these properties precludes the psychological possi-
bility that specific procedures are invoked in particular do-
mains. It is not sufficient to show that certain findings claimed as
support for domain-specific procedures can be explained post
hoc by the theory. From an experimental point of view, more
refined performance measures are required to contrast the
predictions of model theory with those of domain-specific ac-
counts of domain-specific problems, that is, of problems for
which the theory of narrower scope is suited. Alternatively,
empirical work on mental models could be extended to include
neuropsychological data (e.g., studies of individuals with dam-
age to the frontal lobes) that might reveal any functional disso-
ciations (see Shallice, 1988; see also multiple book review, BBS
14(3) 1991), and thereby enrich the debate on the nature of the
underlying cognitive architecture mediating reasoning perfor-
mance. The work of Leslie and others on autism (e.g., Leslie &
Thaiss 1992) confirms the possibility of dissociations in central
processes.
Representational form. The procedures of model theory can
be viewed as basic cognitive operations that allow the construc-
tion of models in a variety of representational forms (e.g.,
visuospatial). Although J-L & B rightly focus on the structural
characteristics of models, it is natural to wonder about the form
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in which models are represented mentally and indeed, such
representations need to be specified if complete computational
descriptions are to be given of performance on specific tasks. We
can gain some clues by looking more closely at the process of
model construction. This process treats the propositions ex-
pressed as data and constructs a mental world in which these
propositions are true. Understanding is tied, temporarily at
least, to the acceptance of the truth of a proposition in a way
compatible with Spinoza's conjectures (see Gilbert 1991) and
consistent with the way that perceptual input guides action. If
there is a close relationship between thought and perception,
one might expect to find correlations between performance in a
perceptual domain and in a reasoning domain. Yet, as far as I
know, such correlations are not obtained. Once again, neuropsy-.
chological data might prove informative. For example, subjects
with deficits in visuospatial processing should perform more
poorly on problems involving spatial descriptions but should not
necessarily fail on syllogisms that do not reference a spatial
dimension.
Processing the model. A robust findirtg is that performance is
worse on problems that require subjects to consider more than
one model. By itself, such a finding is open to two interpreta-
tions. Subjects may stop reasoning when they reach a conclusion
or they may seek to envisage alternative models and fail,
perhaps because of working memory constraints. In some
studies, the former interpretation seems to be correct (Lee &
Oakhill 1984), whereas in others (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara
1984), the latter interpretation seems to be correct. A crucial
question, as J-L & B recognize, concerns what factors cue
subjects to construct alternative models or to flesh out their
initial model. They identify a number of cues, namely: The
meaning of the premises may permit different initial models;
initial conclusions may be considered unbelievable; the tokens
depicting particular entities may be represented as not exhaust-
ing the set of such individuals. In addition, I imagine that some
subjects invoke a heuristic: "Search for counterexamples."
Given the variety of possible cues, it seems unlikely that there is
a single psychological algorithm for evaluating conclusions. In
this view, the proposed algorithm (p. 182), which first negates
the conclusion and then sees whether there is an alternative
model of the premises consistent with it, is one of a number.
Given the above, it seems desirable to obtain more direct
evidence about the process of fleshing out the model in specific
tasks so as to develop more complete accounts. In fact, a recent
study which required individuals to externalize their thinking
under different constraints (Green 1992) confirms the core of the
mental-model account of performance of the selection task. It
has also revealed an apparent paradox. Some individuals envis-
aged the critical counterexample but failed to select it. Such a
finding implicates a postdeductive process which evaluates
possible selections.
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Johnson-Laird & Byrne's (J-L & B's) book argues that we make
deductions not by applying rules of inference to representations
of the logical forms of our premises but by a process which
involves building mental models of the premises and searching
among them for counterexamples to the conclusion. Experi-
ments are reported which (it is claimed) support this theory.
Let it be said at once that the mental-model theory of
deduction has a pictorial quality which many people have found
appealing and inspiring. Nevertheless, J-L & B's book falls short
of the standards one would expect on logical writing today.
There is a fair amount of symbolism, suggesting precision, but
most of it is so poorly explained, or so loosely attached to the
matter in hand, that the reader can only guess what is meant;
time after time it happens that an interpretation which works on
page X won't work on page Y.
From dozens of examples I choose two which are central. The
first is an explanation of how we carry out modus ponens; that is,
given "If p then q" and "p," how we deduce "q " (p. 47, repeated
on p. 196). It is claimed that we start with the first premise,
forming two mental models; the first model represents the case
that p and q hold, and the second "has no explicit content. " The
second premise then eliminates the second model, since it is
true already in the first model. Finally, from the first model we
read off q. It is hard to believe that this protocol has any logical
connection with the deduction that it is supposed to perform.
The second example is the notation "[[a]fo]c" which appears
on page 121 in the treatment of syllogisms. It is said to signify
"that a is exhausted with respect to b, and h is exhausted with
respect to c. " The notion of being "exhausted with respect to
something" is not explained in the text and it means nothing in
logic; I dare wager it means nothing in psychology either. The
interpretation which comes first to mind is that the notation
means "All a's are b's and all b's are c's"; but unfortunately this
reading implies that in order to use the model, we already have
to be able to carry out exactly the deduction which the model
was intended to explain.
This makes it impossible to comment in detail on the theory
proposed in the book; I simply do not know what that theory is.
Two points of methodology call for some remarks, however.
The first is the way in which J-L & B pose the basic contrast
between the formal rules theory and their own mental-model
theory. Supposedly these are two theories about how our minds
work. But the authors tend to explain the difference by using
notions from the mathematical theory of formal systems. A
typical example is on page 212, where they explain that mental
models "do not contain variables." Without some explanation of
what it is for a mental representation to "contain a variable," this
is meaningless. (My own impression is that many of the mental
models described in this book do in fact contain components
which behave pretty much like variables, if one looks at vari-
ables in the appropriate way.) Because of this mismatch between
the phenomena to be explained and the concepts used to explain
them, the book fails to establish a genuine difference between
formal rules and mental models.
The second point of methodology concerns the claim that a
theory of deduction based on mental models "predicts which
problems will be difficult and it predicts which errors ordinary
individuals will make with them" (p. 131). This claim will not
survive a closer look at what is meant by "a theory based on
mental models." Take, for example, the case of syllogisms, as in
Chapter 6. If the theory in question is either (1) the general
theory that we make deductions by forming models of the
premises and looking for counterexamples to the conclusion,
and so on, or (2) the theory of models of syllogisms as presented
in the chapter, then it is too imprecise to have the consequences
claimed, for example about the numbers of models needed for
each syllogism.
One suspects that the authors may have in mind (3), the
detailed theory propounded in Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984).
This theory is different from the one outlined in the chapter, but
it seems to underlie some of the discussion, and it is precise
enough to be written as a computer program. The problem with
this third theory is that it involves, among other things, fourteen
"principles" for carrying out operations, some of them more ad
hoc than others. Since the theory has almost as many degrees of
freedom as the data to be explained, the reasonable fit is hardly
impressive. To justify their claim, the authors need to produce a
theory which is precise enough so that the reader can verify
what predictions it makes, and one that is also derivable from
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